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REFORMING THE SENTENCING
REGIME FOR THE MOST SERIOUS
CRIMES OF CONCERN: THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
THROUGH THE LENS OF THE
LUBANGA TRIAL
INTRODUCTION

T

he International Criminal Court has never been more
important than it is today; especially considering the upcoming trial of President Kenyatta of Kenya, charges against
individuals who worked with Muammar Gaddafi, and a warrant of arrest for Joseph Kony of the Lords Resistance Army.1
Governed by the Rome Statute, the International Criminal
Court (“ICC” or “Court”) has become a true judicial force in the
world and “is the first permanent, treaty based, international
criminal court established to help end impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community.”2 Established in 2002,3 the Court did not hear
its first case until 2008 in the trial of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo
(“Lubanga”), a Congolese warlord accused of the war crimes of
conscripting and enlisting children under the age of fifteen and
using them to actively participate in hostilities.4 On March 14,
2012, a guilty verdict was returned for Lubanga and consequently, on July 10, 2012, Lubanga was the first person ever
sentenced by the ICC.5 The Lubanga trial granted the ICC the
chance to set a strong precedent in its sentencing jurisprudence. However, instead of sending a clear message to other
1. Situations and Cases, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20
cases.aspx.
http://www.icc2. About
the
Court,
INT’L CRIMINAL COURT,
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court (last visited Sept. 18, 2012) (emphasis
added).
3. Id.
4. Marlise Simons, International Court Begins First Trial, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 27, 2009, at A10; Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06,
Judgment
Hearing,
12
(Mar.
14,
2012),
http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1380068.pdf.
5. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment Hearing,
at 12.
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grave offenders, the ICC sentenced Lubanga to only the minimum required by statute.6
International criminal tribunals have often been plagued by
inconsistency and leniency in sentencing.7 With the ICC’s first
case and sentencing, a true legal lens has been provided to
evaluate similar shortcomings of the Court’s statutory sentencing guidelines. This Note explores the ICC’s statutory sentencing guidelines in the wake of the Lubanga trial and argues that
in its attempt to build from the tribulations of prior international tribunals, the ICC has unfortunately failed to consider
penal theories and to set forth the appropriate penalty framework for those convicted of the most serious international
crimes. Specifically, when mitigating factors that decrease the
sentence require less proof than aggravating factors,8 the resulting sentence is increasingly lenient, especially because
there are no mandatory minimums to counteract this effect.
Hence, the ICC is wrongly governed by a thirty-year maximum
sentence as opposed to mandatory minimum sentences, as it
inadequately balances mitigating and aggravating factors, and
ignores guidance from the complementary laws of the nations
involved.
Part I provides background pertaining to the Rome Statute,
the jurisdiction of the ICC, and the crimes committed by
Lubanga. Part II provides a comparative overview of other international tribunals, the United States Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, and the theories of punishment as applied in sev-

6. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. Article
78(3) states that the imprisonment sentence “shall be no less than the highest individual sentence pronounced and shall not exceed 30 years imprisonment.” Id. art. 78(3).
7. See Andrew N. Keller, Punishment for Violations of International
Criminal Law: An Analysis of Sentencing at the ICTY and ICTR, 12 IND.
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 53, 57–74 (2001); Jennifer J. Clark, Note, Zero to Life:
Sentencing Appeals at the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 96 GEO. L.J. 1685, 1707 (2008); Mark A. Drumbl,
Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass
Atrocity, 99 NW. U.L. REV. 539, 554 (2005).
8. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Hearing to Deliver
the
Decision,
4
(July
10,
2012),
http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1440143.pdf. As explored later in Part II, mitigating
factors must be proved by a balancing of the probabilities, whereas aggravating factors must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
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eral domestic sentencing regimes. Part III applies the punishment theories to the ICC to analyze how the thirty-year maximum sentence, joint sentence limitations, and inadequate balance of mitigating and aggravating factors ultimately frustrate
any potential penal justifications for the ICC’s sentencing practices. Part IV considers the failure of the Rome Statute to include deference to domestic laws as an additional guiding
mechanism. Finally, Part V recommends that the thirty-year
maximum sentence should be abolished, mitigating and aggravating factors should require the same standard of proof, and
deference should be given to the laws of the nation that was
harmed by the crime.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Establishment and Purpose of the International Criminal
Court
The ICC is seen as “the culmination of international efforts to
replace impunity with accountability.” 9 The establishment of
an international criminal court had periodically been considered since the 1948 General Assembly meeting of the United
Nations. 10 Following World War II, the world witnessed the
Nuremberg trials, the first attempt at international prosecution and criminal accountability for the crimes of the Holocaust.11 However, it was not until the early 1990s that the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) were
9. Anna Triponel & Stephen Pearson, African States and the International Criminal Court: A Silent Revolution in International Criminal Law, 12 J.L.
& SOC. CHALLENGES 65, 66 (2010).
10. Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. TREATY
COLLECTION, http://legal.un.org/icc/general/overview.htm (last visited Oct. 29,
2013). Following the Holocaust, genocide was a dominant international concern. Id. This concern led many states to adopt the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment on the Crime of Genocide. Id. Additionally, the General Assembly issued a resolution stating that “[r]ecognizing that at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity; and being convinced that, in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, international co-operation is required.” Id.
11. Andrew Dubinsky, Note, An Examination of International Sentencing
Guidelines and a Proposal for Amendments to the International Criminal
Court’s Sentencing Structure, 33 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT
609, 617–18 (2007).
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created to deal with the mass genocides of these respective regions.12 The international attention that was rendered by these
tribunals, and the realization that mass atrocities continued
throughout the world, finally fueled the creation of the ICC.13
In 1998, the General Assembly convened in Rome, Italy for
over a month “to finalize and adopt a convention on the establishment of” the ICC.14 The statute establishing and governing
the ICC, entitled the Rome Statute, went into effect on July 1,
2002 after ratification by the necessary sixty states.15 The ICC
was seen as the “missing link in the international legal system.”16 Unlike the International Court of Justice at The Hague,
which handles civil cases between states, the ICC would deal
with individual criminal liability as an “enforcement mechanism” against human rights violations that often go unpunished.17
B. Bringing Perpetrators of International Crimes before the
ICC: The Rome Statute, Jurisdiction, and Sentencing Guidelines
The Rome Statute is divided into thirteen parts ranging from
the establishment of the Court and its jurisdiction, to the investigation, trial, penalties, appeals, and enforcement of the
Court.18 The thirteen parts, in total, contain the 128 articles
12. Id. at 610–13.
13. Establishment of an International Criminal Court, supra note 10.
14. Id.
15. Alicia Mazurek, Note, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo: The International Criminal Court as It Brings Its First Case to Trial, 86 U. DET. MERCY
L. REV. 535, 536 (2009).
16. Establishment of an International Criminal Court, supra note 10.
17. Id. Another key difference between the International Court of Justice
(“ICJ”) and the International Criminal Court (“ICC” or “Court”) is the compulsory nature of the courts. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Time Has Come for
an International Criminal Court, 1 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 14 (1991).
Since the ICJ only hears civil disputes between states, and never between
individuals of different states, there are unique political sensitivities that
arise. Id. This is why the ICJ provides member states “the choice of compulsory or voluntary submission to jurisdiction.” Id. However, since the ICC has
jurisdiction over individuals, political sensitivities are of a “much lesser nature.” Id.
18. Rome Statute, supra note 6. The statute is specifically divided as follows: Establishment of the Court; Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Applicable
Law; General Principles of Criminal Law; Composition and Administration of
the Court; Investigation and Prosecution; The Trial; Penalties; Appeal and
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that govern the ICC. 19 Article 3 establishes the seat of the
Court at The Hague in the Netherlands, and later Article 62
sets forth the seat of the Court as the place of trial, unless otherwise decided.20
The Rome Statute establishes the structure of the ICC
through the judicial divisions, the Presidency, the Office of the
Prosecutor, and the Registry. 21 There are currently eighteen
judges who are divided amongst the three judicial divisions of
Pre-trial, Trial, and Appeals. 22 Three judges are elected to
make up the presidency and are responsible for the proper administration of the Court.23 The Office of the Prosecutor acts as
an independent and separate organ of the Court and is “responsible for receiving referrals and any substantiated information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, for examining them and for conducting investigations and prosecutions
before the Court.”24 Finally, the Registry handles administrative and “non-judicial aspects” of the ICC. 25 Other “semiautonomous offices . . . fall under the Registry for administrative purposes,” including the Office of Public Counsel for Victims, and the Office of Public Counsel for Defense.26
1. Jurisdiction
The Rome Statute sets forth crimes within the jurisdiction of
the Court, as well as how individual criminal acts may fall
within the jurisdiction of the Court.27 The most serious crimes
of concern to the international community are defined in ArtiRevision; International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance; Enforcement;
Assembly of States Parties; Financing; and Final Clauses. Id.
19. Rome Statute, supra note 6.
20. Id. art. 3, 62.
21. Id. art. 34.
22. Id. art. 39; Structure of the Court, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT,
http://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/Pages/structure%20of%
20the%20court.aspx (last visited Dec. 18, 2012).
23. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 38; Structure of the Court, supra note
22.
24. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 15; Structure of the Court, supra note
22.
25. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 43; Structure of the Court, supra note
22.
26. Structure of the Court, supra note 22.
27. Rome Statute, supra note 6, arts. 12–13.
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cle 5, which grants the Court jurisdiction over international
disputes, including crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.28 However, even
for individuals who committed these crimes, there are still several preconditions that must be satisfied before the ICC has
jurisdiction over a case.
The first hurdle that must be overcome for jurisdiction is ratification of the Rome Statute.29 Once a state ratifies the Rome
Statute, it grants the ICC jurisdiction over two types of individuals: first, citizens of that state, and second, any noncitizen
who commits an Article 5 crime within that state.30 In effect,
the ICC may have jurisdiction over citizens of nonmember
states and this remains a controversial issue.31 One such controversy includes the United States, which has not ratified the
Rome Statute, but has enacted legislation in an attempt to
avoid jurisdiction of the ICC over its citizens who commit Article 5 crimes in other states.32
The second hurdle that must be overcome for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction is the precondition of “complementarity.”33 The
principle of “complementarity” requires that states “utilize the
Court only as a last resort, after first attempting to litigate ICC
28. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 5. The specific crime that Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo is charged with is found in Article 8 where war crimes are
defined. As defined in Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi), “war crimes” means “[o]ther serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of
the following acts: . . . [c]onscripting or enlisting children under the age of
fifteen years into the national armed forces or using them to participate actively in hostilities.” Id. art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi).
29. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 12.
30. See id. art. 12–13; BARRY E. CARTER & ALLEN S. WEINER,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1141, 1145 (6th ed. 2011).
31. See CARTER & WEINER, supra note 30, at 1145–47.
32. Id. at 1142–45. In 2002, the U.S. Congress passed the American Service-Members’ Protection Act, “which barred the United States from cooperating with the ICC.” Id. at 1142. “The law also . . . authorized the President to
use ‘all means necessary and appropriate to bring about the release’ of Americans held by or for the ICC.” Id. Other states have taken issue with these
objections, finding them misconstrued and unnecessary because other procedural safeguards, such as the prerequisites to jurisdiction, remain in place.
Id. at 1143.
33. Rome Statute, supra note 6, pmbl. The preamble states, “the International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be complementary
to national criminal jurisdictions.” Id.
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crimes domestically in their local courts.”34 It is only after the
state is “unwilling or unable” to charge the individuals who violated Article 5 in their own domestic courts that the ICC may
exercise jurisdiction over the case.35
After the state is “unwilling or unable,” there are several
ways that the ICC Prosecutor may become aware of and investigate a claim. First, a state party may refer a situation to the
ICC Prosecutor.36 Second, the Security Council of the United
Nations may also choose to refer a situation to the ICC Prosecutor.37 And third, the ICC Prosecutor may investigate on its
own initiative based on any other information it has received.38
Regardless of the means used to initiate an investigation, so
long as the matter involves a potential defendant who is either
a citizen of a state party, or committed the Article 5 crime in
the territory of a state party, the ICC may accept the case.39
Hence, with 122 state parties to the ICC, a necessary system
has been established for referring situations to the ICC Prose-

34. Triponel & Pearson, supra note 9, at 67.
35. Id. A sham trial conducted by a state would not satisfy this requirement, and the state would be deemed unwilling or unable to prosecute the
case. CARTER & WEINER, supra note 30, at 1143.
36. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 14. Also note that “situation” is the
general terminology used for any matter that may result in a potential case.
See Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, Int’l Criminal Court, Prosecutor
Receives Referral of the Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Apr.
19, 2004), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/
situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200104/press%
20releases/Pages/prosecutor%20receives%20referral%20of%20the%20situatio
n%20in%20the%20democratic%20republic%20of%20congo.aspx. For example,
in Lubanga’s case, the President of the DRC initially sent a letter to the
Prosecutor of the ICC “referring to him the situation of crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court allegedly committed anywhere in the territory of the
DRC since the entry into force of the Rome Statute.” Id. Hence, this falls
within a state party referring the “situation” to the Prosecutor to further investigate and determine if one or more persons should be charged with such
crimes. Id. In comparison, for the more recent “situation” involving the Republic of Kenya, the Prosecutor submitted a request to Kenya to begin an
investigation on its own initiative. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case
No. ICC-01/09, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the
Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya,
4 (Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc854287.pdf.
37. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 13.
38. Id. art. 15.
39. Id. art. 13–15.
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cutor where the state was “unable or unwilling” to investigate.40
2. Sentencing Guidelines
Sentencing guidelines are contained in Part 7 of the Rome
Statute, with applicable penalties and the determination of
sentences addressed in Articles 77 and 78, respectively.41 According to Article 77, a person convicted of an Article 5 crime
may face “[i]mprisonment for a specified number of years which
may not exceed a maximum of 30 years” or “[a] term of life imprisonment when justified by the extreme gravity of the crime
and the individual circumstances . . . .”42 This is not “an elaborate or specific set of sentencing guidelines [but] rather . . . a
vague general description of potential punishments.”43
Article 78 continues with guidelines for determining the sentence, such as in the sentencing of a person convicted of more
than one crime. As specified in Article 78(3),

40. Triponel & Pearson, supra note 7, at 67–72; see also About the Court,
supra note 2.
41. Id. art. 77–78. This Note will not explore the penalty provisions of the
Rome Statute that refer to fines and forfeiture in Article 77(2)(a), and the
establishment of a trust fund by Article 79. Id. arts. 77, 79. For additional
information on these provisions and the Victim’s Trust Fund, see Linda M.
Keller, Seeking Justice at the International Criminal Court: Victims’ Reparations, 29 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 189 (2007); see also Peter G. Fischer, The Victims’ Trust Fund of the International Criminal Court—Formation of a Functional Reparations Scheme, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 187 (2003), for an analysis
of the history of victim’s rights and policy considerations for the ICC Victims’
Trust Fund.
42. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 77. Additionally, this sentencing
guideline is somewhat reiterated in Article 78(1), stating, “[i]n determining
the sentence, the Court shall, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, take into account such factors as the gravity of the crime and the
individual circumstances of the convicted person.” Id. art. 78(1). In the ICC
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 145(3) additionally states that “life
imprisonment may be imposed when justified by the extreme gravity of the
crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person, as evidenced
by the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances.” Int’l Criminal
Court, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, at 55, Official Records No. ICCASP/1/3
(2002),
available
at http://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/icc/legal%20texts%20and%20tools/official%20journal/Docu
ments/RulesProcedureEvidenceEng.pdf [hereinafter Rules of Procedure and
Evidence].
43. Dubinsky, supra note 11, at 617.
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[T]he Court shall pronounce a sentence for each crime and a
joint sentence specifying the total period of imprisonment.
This period shall be no less than the highest individual sentence pronounced and shall not exceed 30 years imprisonment
or a sentence of life imprisonment in conformity with article
77 . . . .44

Under Article 78(2), the Court must deduct from the sentence
any previous time spent in detention in accordance with an order of the Court, and may also deduct any time spent in detention in connection with the crime.45
Article 78(1) requires that in its sentencing procedures, the
ICC refer to the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, which
set forth a wide-range of circumstances that the Court must
also consider.46 First, Article 78(1) requires that the “gravity of
the crime and individual circumstances of the convicted person” be weighed into the sentencing decision. 47 Additionally,
Rule 145 proscribes a non-exhaustive list of mitigating and aggravating circumstances that must be balanced. 48 Mitigating
circumstances include, but are not limited to, “diminished mental capacity,” duress, or the “person’s conduct after the act.”49
Alternatively, aggravating circumstances may include, but are
not limited to, prior criminal convictions, abuse of power, particularly defenseless victims, “particular cruelty,” and “any motive involving discrimination.”50 The standard of proof for such
circumstances is not established in the Rome Statute or the

44. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 78(3).
45. Id. art. 78(2).
46. Id. art. 78(1).
47. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 42. The Rules of Procedure and Evidence provide additional considerations beyond the Rome Statute. For example, according to Rule 145(1)(c),
In addition to the factors mentioned in article 78, paragraph 1, give
consideration, inter alia, to the extent of the damage caused, in particular the harm caused to the victims and their families, the nature
of the unlawful behaviour and the means employed to execute the
crime; the degree of participation of the convicted person; the degree
of intent; the circumstances of manner, time and location; and the
age, education, social and economic condition of the convicted person.
Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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Rules of Procedure and Evidence, leaving such discretion to the
ICC.51 The ICC has currently set the standard of proof for aggravating circumstances as proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
whereas mitigating circumstances are determined by the balancing of probabilities,52 also known as preponderance of the
evidence.53 Overall, the Rome Statute provides the foundation
for the ICC and helps states understand what types of conflicts

51. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Hearing to Deliver
the
Decision,
4
(July
10,
2012),
http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1440143.pdf.
52. It is crucially important to understand the difference in the standards
of proof that the ICC has instituted for aggravating and mitigating factors.
Id. First, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the highest standard of proof,
and has been viewed by the U.S. Supreme Court as “designed to exclude as
nearly as possible the likelihood of an erroneous judgment.” Etan Mark &
Monica F. Rossbach, Que Rico? Discarding the Fallacy That Florida Rico and
Federal Rico Are Identical, 86 FLA. B.J. 10, 12 (Jan. 2012) (citing Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982)). In contrast, balancing of the probabilities,
also known as the preponderance of the evidence, has been recognized as indicating “society’s ‘minimal concern with the outcome.’” Id. In other words,
whereas proof beyond a reasonable doubt entails overwhelming evidence,
balancing of the probabilities only requires “51%” likelihood, or that “more
evidence supports the finding than contradicts it.” Stephen Wilkinson,
Standards of Proof in International Humanitarian and Human Rights Factavailable
at
Finding
and
Inquiry
Missions,
GENEVA ACAD.,
http://www.geneva-academy.ch/docs/Standards%20of%20proo%20report.pdf.
If the ICC wanted to avoid requiring too much proof for aggravating factors,
they could have elected for a middle standard of proof such as “clear and convincing evidence.” Id. The burden for clear and convincing evidence requires
“very solid support,” which is around a “60%” likelihood that the evidence
“supports the finding.” Id. In choosing the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt for aggravating circumstances, and balancing of the probabilities
for mitigating circumstances, the ICC chose standards of proof that were as
far apart on the spectrum as possible. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC01/04-01/06, Hearing to Deliver the Decision, at 4. Hence, the ICC made it
very easy for mitigating circumstances to lessen a sentence, and very difficult
for aggravating circumstances to increase the sentence. Id.
53. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Hearing to Deliver
the Decision, at 4. Based on the Rome Statute, the only way a sentence would
go beyond thirty years is if there were aggravating circumstances. See Rome
Statute, supra note 6, art. 77. However, aggravating circumstances cannot be
factors already considered in the crime itself that must also be proved beyond
a reasonable doubt. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Hearing to Deliver the Decision, at 4. It is difficult to hypothesize where an “aggravating factor” would be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and not be
charged as a crime itself. This is further analyzed in Part III of this Note.
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may fall within the ICC’s jurisdiction, as well as the factors
that are relevant to its sentencing decisions.
C. The First Sentencing: The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga
Dyilo
1. Background on Thomas “Lubanga” Dyilo
The first ever trial and sentence by the ICC was related to
Lubanga’s leadership role in the Forces Patriotiques pour la
Liberation du Congo (“FPLC”), a military wing of the Union of
Congolese Patriots (also known as Union des Patriotes Congolais, or “UPC”) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(“DRC”).54 Lubanga’s abuse of his UPC leadership role would
ultimately lead him to face charges and a conviction for the
criminal acts he committed in the DRC.55
The DRC, formerly known as Zaire, is a country known for its
rich mineral wealth.56 The natural resources of the DRC, and
the wars in neighboring Rwanda and Uganda, have often
caused the DRC to be plagued by conflict.57 Specifically in 1996,
and again in 1998, the DRC was invaded by neighboring
Rwanda and Uganda; these nations claimed to be fighting
against their own rebels who had taken refuge in the DRC.58
The conflict intensified in 2000 when local interethnic conflicts
began to brew within the wider context of the DRC war. 59
Interethnic conflicts increased between the Hema and Lendu

54. Mazurek, supra note 15, at 540–46.
55. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment Hearing,
1–7, 12 (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1380068.pdf.
56. Mazurek, supra note 15, at 540.
57. Id. at 540–41.
58. Timothy B. Reid, Killing Them Softly: Has Foreign Aid to Rwanda and
Uganda Contributed to the Humanitarian Tragedy in the DRC?, 1 AFR. POL’Y
J. 74, 74–75 (2006). From the time of that first invasion and until 2004,
fighting continued between the DRC and Rwanda, leaving an estimated 3.8
million people dead. Id. at 77.
59. Mark A. Drumbl, International Decision: Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo: International Criminal Court Decision Confirming War Crimes
Charges for Conscripting, Enlisting, and Using Child Soldiers, 101 A.J.I.L.
841, 842 (2007).
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peoples over natural resources, land use, and arms smuggling
within the Ituri region of the DRC.60
The UPC was created on September 15, 2000 for the purpose
of establishing and maintaining political and military control
over Ituri.61 The UPC quickly became an ethnic Hema militia
and Lubanga took a primary role in the “common plan to build
[a Hema] army.”62 Throughout the Ituri conflict, armed groups,
including Lubanga’s, often targeted civilians and participated
in “widespread killings, torture, and rape.” 63 “Thousands of
children, some as young as seven were recruited by all sides
and used as fighters.”64 As leader of the UPC, Lubanga recruited child soldiers and would go to people’s homes “ask[ing] for
cash, a cow, or for a child to fight for his rebel army.”65 “In
2003, at the height of the DRC armed conflict as many as
‘30,000 boys and girls’ were conscripted into service.”66 Overall,
an estimated 60,000 people were killed in the Ituri conflict,
many of whom were child soldiers.67
On April 11, 2002, the DRC became a state party to the ICC,
and therefore subject to its jurisdiction.68 In March 2004, Joseph Kabila, president of the DRC, referred the situation in
Ituri to the ICC Prosecutor, asking him to further investigate
the conflict. 69 The ICC Prosecutor’s investigation led to the

60. CHILD SOLDIERS INT’L, Child Soldiers Global Report 2008—Congo,
Democratic
Republic
of
the
(May
20,
2008),
available
at
http://www.refworld.org/docid/486cb0f5c.html.
61. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment Hearing,
5 (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1380068.pdf.
62. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Hearing to Deliver
the Decision, at 5.
63. DR Congo: Q&A on the First Verdict at the International Criminal
RIGHTS
WATCH
(Feb.
29,
2012),
Court,
HUMAN
www.hrw.org/news/2012/02/29/dr-congo-qa-first-verdict-internationalcriminal-court.
64. Id.
65. DR Congo Warlord Thomas Lubanga Sentenced to 14 Years, BBC
NEWS (July 12, 2010), www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18779726.
66. Mazurek, supra note 15, at 541.
67. Id.; DR Congo: Q&A on the First Verdict at the International Criminal
Court, supra note 63.
68. About the Court, supra note 2.
69. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment Hearing,
2 (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1380068.pdf.
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March 2006 arrest of Lubanga. 70 Lubanga remained imprisoned from the time of his initial arrest through the duration of
his trial.71 Pretrial hearings began soon after his arrest, and on
January 29, 2007, the judges confirmed the charges against
Lubanga.72 Lubanga was charged as the co-perpetrator of the
Ituri conflict for “enlisting and conscripting children under the
age of fifteen years … and using [the children] to [actively participate] in hostilities.”73
Lubanga’s trial took place over the course of several years,
with opening statements given on January 26, 2009 and closing
statements given on August 25–26, 2011.74 There were several
delays prior to and during the trial, including those caused by
two stay of proceedings orders, as well as an adjournment for
an interlocutory appeal.75 Finally on March 14, 2012, Lubanga
was found guilty of “the war crimes of enlisting and conscripting children under the age of fifteen years and using them to
participate actively in hostilities in the DRC between September 2002 and August 2003.”76 On July 10, 2012 the ICC held its
first sentencing hearing, and Lubanga was sentenced to fourteen years imprisonment.77
2. The Sentencing of Lubanga
The ICC was founded on the premise that “[t]he most serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole

70. Lubanga Case, COALITION FOR THE INT’L CRIMINAL COURT,
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=drctimelinelubanga (last visited Aug. 22, 2013).
The DRC’s ratification of the Rome Statute and its inability to prosecute
Lubanga as shown by its referral to the ICC Prosecutor were the necessary
preconditions to grant the ICC jurisdiction.
71. Id.
72. Wairagala Wakabi, Timeline: Lubanga’s War Crimes Trial at the ICC,
LUBANGA TRIAL AT THE INT’L CRIMINAL COURT (Sept. 14, 2010),
http://www.lubangatrial.org/2010/09/14/timeline-lubanga’s-war-crimes-trialat-the-icc/. On March 17, 2006, Lubanga made his first appearance before the
Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC. Id.
73. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment Hearing,
at 1.
74. Id. at 3.
75. Id. at 2–3.
76. Id. at 12.
77. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Hearing to Deliver
the
Decision,
12
(July
10,
2012),
http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1440143.pdf.
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must not go unpunished.”78 The Court cited to this at Lubanga’s sentencing, and attempted to make clear that it was taking
this important background principle into account.79 In arriving
at its sentence for Lubanga, the Court specifically considered
the provisions of Articles 77 and 78 of the Rome Statute, as
well as Rule 145 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.80
The Court applied and balanced the factors from Article 78
and Rule 145, which together mention the “gravity of the crime
and the individual circumstances,” as well as “mitigating and
aggravating circumstances.”81 First, the Court considered the
gravity of Lubanga’s crime, finding it to be “very serious” and
“affect[ing] the community as whole.”82 This was exacerbated
by the element of “compulsion”83 in the crime of conscripting.84
Next, special attention was given to the vulnerability of the
children involved as compared to the general population, recognizing that children must be afforded “particular protection.” 85 For example, the physical well-being of children was
placed at risk of fatal and nonfatal injuries from the violence,
and the children may continue to suffer serious trauma to their
psychological well-being.86 Although the exact number of children involved in the conflict could not be identified, the Court
determined that the use of children was “widespread.” 87 The
78. Id. (quoting Rome Statute, supra note 6, pmbl.).
79. See id. at 1.
80. Id. at 4–8.
81. Id. at 2; Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 78.
82. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Hearing to Deliver
the Decision, at 4; Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 78.
83. Based on the long-accepted doctrine of international human rights law,
it is not necessary to show the element of compulsion in proving the crime of
conscription. Christie Nicoson, Lisa Dailey & Rachel Hall, The International
WITHOUT GENOCIDE,
worldwithoutgenoCriminal
Court,
WORLD
cide.org/genocides-and-conflicts/icc (last visited Oct. 22, 2012). Therefore,
showing this element only worsens or further contributes to the findings
against the defendant.
84. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Hearing to Deliver
the Decision, at 4.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 5.
87. Id. It is also important to note that in the circumstances of this case,
the Court states the following should be considered as part of the gravity of
the crime:
[T]he extent of the damage caused, and in particular the harm
caused to the victims and their families, the nature of the unlawful
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Court also recognized that Lubanga is “an intelligent and welleducated individual, who would have understood the seriousness of the crimes of which he has been found guilty.”88 Although a relevant factor, this was not considered an “aggravating” circumstance because factors considered within the gravity
of the crime cannot be counted twice or additionally considered
to be an aggravating circumstance.89
In Lubanga’s case, several possible aggravating circumstances were considered, including the punishment inflicted among
child soldiers and instances of sexual violence. 90 Although
Lubanga was not specifically charged with these crimes, the
ICC Prosecutor was still able to put them forth as aggravating
circumstances.91 However, the Court was unable to take such
circumstances into account because the ICC Prosecutor could
not prove them beyond a reasonable doubt—the Courtestablished standard of proof for aggravating circumstances.92
There were, however, mitigating factors that the ICC found to
be adequate under the Court-established standard of proof of
balancing the probabilities. 93 Mitigating factors included
Lubanga’s “respectful and co-operative [nature] throughout the
proceedings,” even when placed “under considerable unwarranted pressure by the conduct of the prosecution.”94

behavior and the means employed to execute the crime; the degree of
participation of the convicted person; the degree of intent; the circumstances of manner; time and location; and the age, education, social and economic condition of the convicted person.
Id. Specifically, in the case of Lubanga, the Court later notes that it has
“borne in mind the widespread recruitment and the significant use of child
soldiers during the time-frame of the charges; the position of authority held
by Mr. Lubanga within the UPC/FPLC and his essential contribution to the
common plan that resulted, in the ordinary course of events . . . .” Id. at 10.
88. Id. at 6.
89. Id. at 8. As an additional example, the Court mentions that age is already considered in evaluating both the gravity of the crime and the individual and cannot be considered additionally as an aggravating factor. Id.
90. Id. at 7.
91. Id. at 4.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 9. The Court lists all of the “particularly onerous circumstances,”
that Lubanga faced during his trial proceedings. Id. It is unclear if the Court
viewed this as one mitigating factor or several mitigating factors. Id.
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In accordance with Article 78(3), the Court announced a sentence for each crime Lubanga was found guilty of and a “joint
sentence specifying the total period of imprisonment.”95 Lubanga was sentenced to thirteen years’ imprisonment for conscripting children under the age of fifteen to join the UPC, twelve
years imprisonment for enlisting children under the age of fifteen to join the UPC, and fourteen years’ imprisonment for using children under the age of fifteen to participate actively in
hostilities.96 However, despite the twelve- to fourteen-year sentences accompanying each crime, the majority 97 of the Court
sentenced Lubanga to a total period of fourteen years imprisonment.98 Additionally, pursuant to Article 78(2), the Court deducted the six years Lubanga spent in custody since 2006, finding that only eight years would remain on his sentence.99
II. COMPARATIVE SENTENCING REGIMES AND PENAL THEORIES
THAT MAY PROVIDE JUSTIFICATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
SENTENCING
A. Overview of Sentencing in the International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda
The ICTY and ICTR, two of the most prominent international
tribunals to precede the ICC, were established to “prosecute
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law.” 100 The ICTY addresses widespread human

95. Id. at 11; Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 78(3).
96. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Hearing to Deliver
the Decision, at 11.
97. Id. at 12. Judge Odio Benito wrote a separate and dissenting opinion in
regards to a particular and discrete issue. Judge Benito believed that Lubanga should have been given an overall sentence of fifteen years due to the
“damage caused to the victims and their families, particularly as a result of
the harsh punishments and sexual violence suffered by the victims of these
crimes pursuant to Rule 145(1)(c) of the Rules.” Id. The issue of considering
sexual violence as an aggravating circumstance is explored in Part II.B.1. of
this Note.
98. Id.; see infra text accompanying note 194.
99. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Hearing to Deliver
the Decision, at 12.
100. Clark, supra note 7, at 1687 (quoting Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 1, Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1602; Statute of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 1, May
25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192).
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rights abuses in the former Yugoslavia since 1991, including
violations of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and violations of
the laws or customs of war, genocide, and crimes against humanity.101 The ICTR assumes jurisdiction over criminal matters, specifically genocide and violations of international humanitarian law that occurred in Rwanda and neighboring
states in 1994.102
The two tribunals are structured similarly to one another;
they often issue a joint or global sentence when there are multiple convictions, or they issue separate sentences that are
served concurrently. 103 The “gravity of the offence,” the individual’s circumstances, and aggravating and mitigating factors
are all considered in sentencing.104 The ICTY and ICTR also
provide for recourse to the general sentencing practices of the
“former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda, respectively.”105 In reaching
a “suitable” sentence, the ICTY and ICTR judges are given
what others have labeled as “remarkably wide” or “unfettered
discretion to evaluate the facts and attendant circumstances.” 106 However, such unfettered discretion and the resulting
sentences are not without criticism.
Both the ICTY and ICTR have been criticized for several reasons, reasons which often play a role in the resulting nonuniform sentences for similar offenders.107 One criticism is the lack
of explanation for the prescribed term of years, resulting in
sentences that lose effectiveness and legitimacy. 108 A widely
cited example in the ICTY includes the convictions of Generals

101. Mark D. Kielsgard, War on the International Criminal Court, 8 N.Y.
CITY L. REV. 1, 4 (2005).
102. Id.
103. Clark, supra note 7, at 1688.
104. Id. at 1689.
105. Id.; see infra text accompanying note 199.
106. Clark, supra note 7, at 1689; Drumbl, supra note 7, at 553. “The ‘unfettered discretion’ to sentence delegated to international judges inexorably
leads to a broad range of actual sentences.” Id. at 558.
107. See supra text accompanying note 7.
108. Clark, supra note 7, at 1689–94. Legitimacy largely depended on consistency in punishment, because consistency in exchange reflects the “notion
of equal justice.” Id. at 1689. Global sentences may contribute to a lack of
legitimacy because “[t]he practice of issuing a single, global sentence for multiple crimes makes it difficult to demonstrate with precision the extent to
which similar defendants receive different penalties for similar crimes.” Id. at
1692.
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Tihomir Blaskic and Dario Kordic.109 Although both convictions
were very similar in nature and included the “crimes against
humanity of persecution, murder, and inhumane acts,” Blaskic
was sentenced to forty-five years, and “Kordic to only twentyfive years.”110 Additionally, despite the gravity of the crimes in
the former Yugoslavia, only one of the ICTY’s sixty-two convictions has resulted in a life sentence. 111 The ICTY and ICTR
have also been criticized as giving insufficient weight to mitigating and aggravating factors, and sentences in both tribunals
have been revised for this reason.112 Andrew N. Keller, author
of Punishment for Violations of International Criminal Law: An
Analysis Of Sentencing at the ICTY and ICTR, critiques that
“the Trial Chambers [have] full discretion to consider any other
aggravating and mitigating circumstance, and to give ‘due
weight’ to those factors in the determination of an appropriate
punishment . . . perhaps [the discretion is] too broad and
should be limited by general sentencing guidelines.”113
Finally, although the reasons for the establishment of these
tribunals are clear, the tribunals’ justifications for punishment
are not. In the case of the ICTY, “[t]he Security Council argued
in a resolution establishing the tribunal that its purpose would
be to bring to justice persons who are responsible for the crimes
as well as to deter and to contribute to the restoration and
maintenance of peace.” 114 However, not only is the statutory
language silent as to the penal theories, but the judicial decisions are also inconsistent. An analysis of ICTY judgments
from the years 2000 to 2005 reveals that there are “judgments
that cite retribution as the ‘primary objective’ and deterrence
as a ‘further hope,’ warning deterrence ‘should not be given undue prominence,’ and judgments that flatly state ‘deterrence

109. See id. at 1692.
110. Id.
111. Id. The lack of life sentences should be a particularly alarming precedent to the ICC, especially considering that both the ICTY and the ICC were
established for the unique purpose of dealing with criminals who have violated some of the most serious international crimes and/or fundamental human
rights.
112. See id. at 1693–94.
113. Keller, supra note 7, at 57.
114. Christoph J.M. Safferling, The Justification of Punishment in International Criminal Law, 4 AUSTRIAN REV. INT’L & EUR. L. 126, 146 (1999).
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probably is the most important factor in the assessment of appropriate sentences.’”115
Although the ICTY and ICTR clearly highlight some of the
criticisms the ICC may face, in order to find a sentencing rationale in the international context, it may be best to look at
attempts to justify domestic punishment.116
B. The United States Federal Sentencing Guidelines as a
Roadmap for Sentencing
Sentencing regimes pose a challenge for most nations, and it
is not surprising that the ICC may struggle in its early years to
reach a proper balance, even with the precedent and criticisms
of the ICTY and ICTR as guidance. The United States Federal
Sentencing Guidelines also serve as an example of how difficult
it may be to limit judicial discretion in sentencing. However, a
U.S. federal statute, 18 U.S.C. §3553(a), provides a helpful reference.117 Specifically, 18 U.S.C. §3553(a) lists several factors a
court should use to determine a “reasonable” sentence.118 These
factors, in turn, provide a roadmap for rectifying the shortcomings of the ICC.
Up until the 1970s, federal sentencing in the United States
was discretionary and granted judges an enormous amount of
authority in crafting sentences. 119 The Federal Sentencing
115. Drumbl, supra note 7, at 561. As discussed throughout this Note, the
issue is not that the ICC, like the ICTY and ICTR, does not speak clearly to
one theory of punishment. The issue is, however, when statutory guidelines
of the ICC do not satisfy or serve any justification of punishment.
116. See Safferling, supra note 114, at 128 (discussing domestic theories of
punishment and stating, “before we try to find a rationale for sentencing in
international criminal law, we want to look at attempts to justify domestic
punishment”).
117. 18 U.S.C. §3553(a) (2006).
118. Id.; see also Christine DeMaso, Advisory Sentencing and the Federalization of Crime: Should Federal Sentencing Judges Consider the Disparity
Between State and Federal Sentences Under Booker?, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
2095, 2108 (2006) (noting “the [Supreme] Court corrected this constitutional
defect by declaring the Guidelines advisory and instructing appellate courts
to review sentences for ‘reasonableness’”).
119. See Rosemary T. Cakmis, The Role of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in the Wake of United States v. Booker and United States v. Fanfan, 56
MERCER L. REV. 1131, 1133 (2005).
For almost a century, until the federal sentencing guidelines went
into effect in 1986, federal judges wielded broad discretion under an
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Guidelines were enacted in 1987 as a means to eliminate disparate criminal sentences. 120 Although the mandatory guidelines reduced disparity, they did not always provide for a “fitting” punishment, 121 and in 2005 the role of the guidelines
sharply changed. In United States v. Booker, the sentencing
guidelines were rendered advisory in nature, leaving sentencing to the district courts’ discretion and largely guided by the
factors contained within 18 U.S.C. §3553(a).122
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)(1), the “nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant” must be considered. 123 Additionally, 18 U.S.C.
§3553(a)(2) is especially significant as it shows the importance
placed on several penal theories by the United States in federal
sentences. The section provides reference to the theories of retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation. 124 Both 18 U.S.C.
indeterminate sentencing system, whereby federal judges could impose any sentence upon criminal defendants from probation up to
and including the statutory maximum as set forth in the United
States Code.
Id.
120. Ramon E. Javier, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Need to Restore “The Balance,” 9 J. SUFFOLK ACAD. L. 179, 180 (1994). The Federal Sentencing Guidelines were initially mandatory and binding. Id.
121. There were several criticisms during the era of binding Federal Sentencing Guidelines. For example, under a three-strikes policy that was initiated, repeat offenders would face life imprisonment on their third offense and
it was not necessary that all offenses were violent felonies. See Nkechi Taifa,
“Three-Strikes-and-You’re-Out”—Mandatory Life Imprisonment for Third
Time Felons, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 717, 719 (1995).
122. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 222 (2005); DeMaso, supra note
118, at 2108. In other words, Booker “returns to judges their traditional authority to craft an individualized sentence for the defendant standing before
them and it allows them to consider facts outside of the guidelines.” Id.
123. 18 U.S.C. §3553(a) (2006). The ICC, as governed by the Rome Statute,
does this by considering the gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances. However, this still leaves open the issue of how mitigating and aggravating circumstances are additionally considered and often unequally
weighed into the sentencing equation. This issue is discussed in Part III of
this Note.
124. 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)(2) (2006).
(a) Factors To Be Considered in Imposing a Sentence—The court
shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to
comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court, in determining the particular sentence to be im-
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§3553(3) and (4) refer to the kind of sentences available, and
the associated sentencing ranges.125 Lastly, 18 U.S.C. §3553(6)
refers to “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities
among defendants with similar records who have been found
guilty of similar conduct.” 126 However, the ICC has only one
determinate guideline: that the sentence does not exceed thirty
years unless justified by the extreme gravity of the crime and
the individual circumstances of the convicted person.127
C. Theories of Punishment in Domestic Criminal Justice Systems
There are several theories of punishment that are incorporated into sentencing guidelines in states throughout the
world, including, but not limited to, the United States, Singapore, Hong Kong, New Zealand, Finland, Sweden, and Germany.128 As referenced in 18 U.S.C. §3553(a), the most prominent
theories include retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation.129
posed, shall consider . . . 2) the need for the sentence imposed—(A) to
reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law,
and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from
further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant
with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.
Id.
125. 18 U.S.C. §3553(a) (2006). Other than the thirty-year limitation, the
Rome Statute does not set forth any sentencing ranges for the international
crimes it governs. See Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 78(3).
126. 18 U.S.C. §3553(a) (2006). The U.S. federal statute contains two additional provisions not discussed in this Note. Section (a)(7) states the need to
provide restitution to any victims of the offense. Id. Section (a)(5) discusses
any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. Id.
127. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 78(3).
128. See 18 U.S.C. §3553(a) (2006); Tan Yock Lin, Public Interest in Sentencing: Deterrence or Desert or Anything Else?, 2009 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 25
(2009); Kelly Busche & W. David Walls, Proportional Justice Versus Efficient
Deterrence in Hong Kong Criminal Sentencing, 25 HONG KONG L.J. 180
(1995); The Rationales and Goals of Sentencing, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.govt.nz/publications/global-publications/s/sentencingpolicy-and-guidance-a-discussion-paper/3.-the-rationales-and-goals-ofsentencing (last visited Feb. 18, 2013) (N.Z.) [hereinafter New Zealand Sentencing Paper]; Edward J. Eberle, The Method and Role of Comparative Law,
8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 451, 484–85 (2009).
129. 18 U.S.C. §3553(a) (2006).
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Another theory often considered in the international context is
restorative justice.130 The ICC, however, refuses to refer to any
punishment theories in its decisions and sentencing guidelines.131 Additionally, the ICC and the Rome Statute have never purported to ascribe to any of these theories specifically.132
Rather, the ICC merely looks at the gravity of the crime and
the individual circumstances.133 Notwithstanding, punishment
theories, as seen through the example of several states, provide
important considerations in sentencing and should serve as
underlying justifications for imposing individual criminal liability on an international scale.134 Furthermore, they highlight
the shortcomings of the Rome Statute as demonstrated by the
Lubanga trial.
Similar to the United States, criminal statutes in Singapore,
Hong Kong, and New Zealand recognize the several theories of
punishment to include retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation.135 The theory of retribution specifically focuses on the in-

130. See Jessica Leinwand, Punishing Horrific Crime: Reconciling International Prosecution with National Sentencing Practices, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 799, 809–10 (2009).
131. See generally Drumbl, supra note 7, at 558 (stating that “international
criminal tribunals . . . are silent as to the penological purpose of the sentences imposed”). See also David Bosco, The International Criminal Court and
Crime Prevention: Byproduct or Conscious Goal?, 19 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 163,
194 (2011).
The guidelines for sentencing at the ICC are elaborated in the Rule
of Procedure and Evidence, but they do not include any reference to
the deterrence function or indeed to any of the traditional purposes
of punishment . . . a number of aggravating and mitigating conditions are also listed, but none of them relate specifically to prevention or deterrence.
Id.
132. See supra text accompanying note 131.
133. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 78(1).
134. See sources cited supra note 128.
135. See Lin, supra note 128, at 26 (discussing the Singapore case, R. v.
Sargeant, and stating “there are four (classical) sentencing goals or aims:
retribution, deterrence, prevention and rehabilitation”); Busche & Walls, supra note 128, at 180 (discussing the balancing of different penal theories and
stating that “[l]egal scholars suggest that the criminal justice system has
several aims: retribution, reformation, incapacitation, individual deterrence,
and general deterrence. These aims can be thought of as combining considerations of justice relating to past actions and considerations of deterrence of
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dividual offender, and the punishment is set forth simply as
commensurate with what the criminal deserves. 136 As expressed by the courts in New Zealand, “the judicial obligation is
to ensure that the punishment [the courts] impose in the name
of the community is itself a civilized reaction, determined not
on impulse or emotion but in terms of justice and deliberations.”137 Retribution is also considered to be “proportional justice,” where the punishment increases directly with the seriousness of the crime.138 In Finland, for example, the penal code
states, “punishment shall be measured so that it is in just proportion to the damage and the danger caused by the offence
and to the guilt of the offender manifested in the offence.”139
The 1989 Swedish Criminal Code has a similar statement,
where the key factors considered for punishment include “the
harm, offence or risk which the conduct involved, what the accused realized or should have realized about it, and the intention and motives of the accused.”140 Ultimately, the moral culpability of the offender places the duty to punish on society.141
The punishment should fit the crime, and the sentence should
be comparable to the crime.142 Therefore, retributive rationales
are backward-looking and result in a moral balance being rectified.143
The theories of deterrence and rehabilitation both fall within
the wider category of utilitarian punishment theories.144 Utilitarianism, as compared to retribution, focuses on the ultimate
betterment of society, and in the case of general deterrence, the

crime by control of future criminal behavior”) (internal citations omitted); see
generally New Zealand Sentencing Paper, supra note 128.
136. JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 38–46 (5th
ed. 2007).
137. New Zealand Sentencing Paper, supra note 128.
138. Ryan Florio, The [Capital] Punishment Fits the Crime: A Comparative
Analysis of the Death Penalty and Proportionality in the United States of
America and the People’s Republic of China, 16 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 43, 51–52 (2008).
139. New Zealand Sentencing Paper, supra note 128.
140. Id. (quoting A. ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 83 (1st
ed. 1992)).
141. DRESSLER, supra note 136, at 38–46.
142. Id.; Leinwand, supra note 130, at 804.
143. See Dubinsky, supra note 11, at 618.
144. DRESSLER, supra note 136, at 33–38. Prevention is often considered
with deterrence and rehabilitation under utilitarianism. Id.
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offender becomes part of the means to reach a “greater social
good.”145 The purpose of general deterrence is to dissuade others from such acts in the future.146 The New Zealand courts
have also recognized the use of imprisonment as a general deterrent, stating that “there can be no time when it is more necessary for the court to use their sentencing powers firmly in the
hope of deterrence than at the early stage of the growth of a
new social evil.”147 It is important to note, however, that the
effectiveness of deterrence often depends on a potential offender’s knowledge as to the likelihood of being caught and convicted, and on the likely penalty.148
Rehabilitation may also be considered, in the hopes of helping
and reforming those who have committed crimes.149 In many
European countries, for example, the focus is on rehabilitation
so that convicted criminals can reenter society and resume a
normal life.150 For this reason, life imprisonment is rarely imposed and the death penalty is not an option.151 The importance
of re-socialization is seen in a famous German Constitutional
Court case, often referred to as “Lebach.”152 In that case, the
court granted an injunction so that a documentary on a convicted criminal could not be released after the offender had
145. New Zealand Sentencing Paper, supra note 128.
146. Deterrence is usually divided into general and individual deterrence.
Id. “If individual deterrence is the goal, then penalties are escalated once a
person starts reoffending. The sentencing judge could, for example, choose to
make an example of a persistent burglar by imprisoning him or her for the
maximum term, even if the current offense is relatively minor.” Id. This can
also be analogized to the United States three-strikes policy. See Taifa, supra
note 121. However, in the international context this will likely be less relevant as the ICC should not be dealing with repeat offenders for crime of the
most serious concern to the international community.
147. New Zealand Sentencing Paper, supra note 128.
148. Id. It is important to note that although retribution and utilitarian
theories of punishment have very different means of reaching a just punishment, this does not necessarily mean they will result in different ends. Hypothetically, a sentence of forty years for murder may be considered proportional to the crime and it may also be sufficient to deter others from committing a
similar crime.
149. DRESSLER, supra note 136, at 33–45.
150. Eberle, supra note 128, at 484–85.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 485. Eberle, the author, also explains this case as an example of
a situation where the felon’s healthy re-entry into society was more important than an accurate depiction of his role in a notorious crime. Id.
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served his prison sentence.153 In the judgment, the court gave
priority to protection of personality over freedom of expression
or information, and found the right to re-socialization to be an
integral part of the offender’s constitutionally guaranteed
rights.154 Ultimately, utilitarian rationales are forward-looking,
hoping to both deter and rehabilitate the offender, while generally deterring society as a whole.
Finally, restorative justice is often considered on an international scale in order to encourage peace building for the nation.155 One definition of restorative justice is the “bringing together [of] individuals who have been affected by an offense
and having them agree on how to repair the harm caused by
the crime.”156 The hope is that restorative justice will result in
a restoration that both benefits and is agreed upon by the victims, the offenders, and the affected communities.157 Although
a newer penal theory with less practical examples, many scholars consider restorative justice an important consideration for
international courts.158
Overall, the ICC’s main goal is to end impunity, or exemption, from punishment. Despite the Rome Statute’s clear
statement of this goal, the statute fails to provide any penal
theory, or combination of theories, to justify such punishment.
It remains unclear if sentences should be driven by a backward- or forward-looking approach, and whether the needs of
victims, the needs of society as a whole, or the rehabilitation of
victims should be given primary, if any, importance. The ICTY,
ICTR, and the U.S. federal sentencing regime provide a comparative tool that can be used to show where the ICC has fallen
short in its sentencing guidelines, and in the sentencing of
153. Christine Morgenstern, Judicial Rehabilitation in Germany—The Use
of Criminal Records and the Removal of Recorded Convictions, 3 EUR. J.
PROBATION 20, 22 (2011).
154. Id.
155. Leinwand, supra note 130, at 809–10.
156. Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 205, 228 (2003).
157. Id. The article provides some examples of restorative justice, such as
“family group conferencing in Australia and New Zealand, community reparative boards in Vermont, circle sentencing in Canada, and victim-offender
mediation throughout North America and Europe—all aimed at bringing
stakeholders together to fashion appropriate resolutions to crime, typically
through mediated dialogue.” Id. at 229.
158. See generally Leinwand, supra note 130; Luna, supra note 156.
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Lubanga. Furthermore, they highlight how the ICC has failed
to account for the theories of punishment, which provide important justifications that could help the ICC to reach its goals.
III. MITIGATING AND AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES, MAXIMUM
SENTENCES, AND GLOBAL SENTENCES ONLY FRUSTRATE THE
THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT THAT THE ICC MAY CONSIDER
In an attempt to solve the problems and inconsistencies that
plagued the ICTY and ICTR, the Rome Statute and the ICC
have made it increasingly difficult to consider any of the penal
theories. One major concern that was prevalent in both the
ICTY and ICTR was the unequal weight given to mitigating
and aggravating circumstances.159 As a consequence, the ICTY
and ICTR were often criticized as having discretion that was
too broad, resulting in sentences that lacked uniformity and
were too far removed from the theories of punishment.160
With the intention to resolve this problem, or at least to allow
for more consistent sentences, the Rome Statute set forth the
thirty-year maximum imprisonment sentence, with a life sentence available only in extreme circumstances.161 However, the
159. See sources cited supra note 7.
160. See Keller, supra note 7, at 57–74 (discussing that in the use of aggravating and mitigating circumstances “discretion is perhaps too broad,” and
“[t]he ICTY and ICTR should reassess certain aspects of their sentencing
practice with regard to the use of aggravating and mitigating circumstances,
the Trial Chambers must refrain from deviating substantially from the principles of deterrence and retribution merely because of the existence of mitigating factors”); see generally Clark, supra note 7, at 1707–08 (discussing the
lack of uniformity in Ad Hoc Tribunal’s sentencing, where many times on
appeal, the Appeals Chamber had to increase or decrease a sentence due to
the weight that the Trial Chamber had given to both mitigating and aggravating factors. In the ICTY, a two-and-a-half-year sentence was found to be
“manifestly inadequate,” and in the ICTR, cases on appeal included purported mitigating factors of relative insignificance).
161. See Ines Monica Weinberg de Roca & Christopher M. Rassi, Sentencing
and Incarceration in the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 44 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 8–9 (2008).
According to commentators, the primary goal of sentencing reform in
the past thirty years has been to eliminate disparity in the punishment of offenders for similar crimes . . . Notably, the ICC has attempted to streamline sentencing practice. Article 77 of the ICC
Statute allows for the imposition of a term not to exceed thirty years
or the imposition of a life sentence. In Article 77(1)(b), when ‘justified
by the extreme gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances
of the convicted person.’
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provisions of the Rome Statute have not resolved these problems, but actually created more of them. First, the inconsistencies created by mitigating and aggravating circumstances remains and can be seen by their unequal application in Lubanga’s sentence. Second, the thirty-year maximum provision, together with the use of joint and concurrent sentences, will likely lead to more lenient sentences.
A. The Problems That Remain from the ICTY and ICTR: Unequal Balance of Mitigating and Aggravating Circumstances in
the ICC
The unequal balancing of mitigating and aggravating circumstances that often caused lenient and inconsistent sentencing
in the ICTY and ICTR are likely to have the same result in the
ICC as seen through the example of the Lubanga trial.162 As
discussed in Collective Violence and Individual Punishment:
The Criminality of Mass Atrocity, Professor Mark Drumbl 163
states:
No ordering principle is provided as to the relative weight to
attribute to any of these [aggravating and mitigating] factors.
Nor is there any explicit guidance as to the weight to accord
to a factor in sentencing when that same factor already may
have been considered in establishing the mental element of
the substantive offense. Consequently, the quantification of
sentence in individual cases still is effectively left to the exercise of judicial discretion in a manner similar to the ICTY and
ICTR. Nor does the ICC’s . . . law provide any significant
guidance regarding the purposes of sentencing.164

Despite the intent of the drafters of the Rome Statute to
adopt what they “considered the best rulings and practices of
earlier courts,” Lubanga’s case demonstrates that Drumbl’s

Id.
162. See generally sources cited supra note 7.
163. Professor Mark Drumbl has researched, published, and given numerous lectures in the area of international criminal law, especially relating to
child soldiers. For more information, see Mark A. Drumbl, WASH. & LEE UNIV.
SCH. OF LAW, law.wlu.edu/faculty/profiledetail.asp?id=11 (last visited Jan. 12,
2013).
164. Drumbl, supra note 7, at 554 (internal citations omitted).
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statement is correct and the ICC has fallen victim to the same
criticism as the ICTY and ICTR.165
First, the Lubanga Court’s decision to adopt unequal standards of proof for aggravating and mitigating circumstances
demonstrates that the Court’s discretion is too broad. At the
sentencing hearing, the Court stated that “[i]t is for the Chamber to establish the standard of proof for the purposes of sentencing, given the Statute and the Rules do not provide any
guidance.”166 The Court continues to explain that because the
aggravating factors established “may have a significant effect
on the overall length of the sentence []Lubanga will serve, it is
necessary that they are established to the criminal standard of
proof, namely ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’” 167 Mitigating circumstances, however, were granted the much lower evidentiary
standard of being established by a balancing of the probabilities.168
Not only are these standards now evaluated on far from
equal footing, but a circular problem is created as aggravating
circumstances cannot be factors considered within the gravity
of the crime, and they must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.169 However, if a crime or charge could be proved beyond
a reasonable doubt, then the ICC Prosecutor would have likely
charged the defendant with that crime.170 For example, the ICC
Prosecutor did not charge Lubanga with rape and other forms
of sexual violence as separate or additional crimes. 171 The
165. Patricia M. Wald, Sharpening the Cutting Edge of International Human Rights Law: Unresolved Issues of War Crimes Tribunal, 30 B.C. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 15, 27 (2007).
166. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Hearing to Deliver
the Decision, at 4.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 8.
170. Although, in the July 10 Hearing to Deliver the Decision, the Court
seems to be of the view that the ICC Prosecutor “failed” to charge Lubanga
with sexual crimes, this still does not alter the problem that arises when aggravating circumstances must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 7.
171. Id. at 6–7. There are issues that arise with this, as the Court seems to
blame the ICC Prosecutor for failing to include this as a charged offense and
then for referring to it throughout trial. Id. However, knowing this was an
important factor, especially to victims, makes it increasingly unfair that the
Court did not allow its inclusion and shows that the Court’s discretion was
too broad. Id. The Court knew this was a factor that was going to be considered in sentencing, and using “the balancing of probabilities” would have
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Court was unable to conclude that “sexual violence against the
children who were recruited was sufficiently widespread to
mean that it could be characterized as occurring in the ordinary course of the implementation of the common plan for
which []Lubanga is responsible,” and hence, Lubanga’s role
could not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.172 These factors, however, still should have been given some consideration
in sentencing, especially since the purpose of aggravating circumstances is to give weight to additional negative factors affecting the defendant’s role or crime.173 The Court has ultimately set a standard of proof that will almost always fail to consider aggravating circumstances.174 In contrast, if the much lower
standard of proof that applies to mitigating circumstances, balancing of the probabilities, applied equally to aggravating circumstances, then Lubanga’s role in sexual crimes would have
likely qualified as an aggravating circumstance.
Rather than learning from the inconsistent sentencing that
plagued the ICTY and ICTR, the ICC’s broad discretion will
likely lead it down an analogous, nonuniform path where similar crimes result in a wide range of sentences.175 Furthermore,
the Court’s broad discretion has resulted in a lenient sentence
that does not seem to serve the theories of punishment. Lubanga was found guilty of conscripting, enlisting, and having children under the age of fifteen participate actively in hostilities.
However, his sentence seems to go against both retributive and
utilitarian theories, as a high bar has been placed that denies

made it very likely that this could be considered in Lubanga’s sentencing as
compared to the standard of proof that was set forth for aggravating circumstances.
172. Id. at 7.
173. Id. at 4. It is also important to note that aggravating, mitigating, and
individual circumstances, as well as the gravity of the crime, are all factored
into the sentencing equation. Id. Why the court chose to acknowledge that
aggravating circumstances have a significant impact on sentencing, but did
not say mitigating circumstances have an impact, only adds to the confusion
set forth by the ICC in its first sentencing. See id. As the Court mentions,
there is nothing in the rules that provides guidance on the standard of proof.
Id. However, that being said, there is also nothing that gives the Court reason to set different and unequal standards.
174. See generally id. at 4.
175. See generally Clark, supra note 7, at 1707. This statement follows the
assumption that the ICC will continue to follow a similar path to that of the
ICTY and ICTR.
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consideration of the possible sexual crimes and punishments
the defendant committed, but allows leniency for the defendant’s respect and cooperation during proceedings. First, under
the retributive theory, Lubanga’s true moral culpability is not
considered because aggravating circumstances, such as sexual
crimes, cannot be factored into sentencing, but mitigating circumstances can and ultimately allow for leniency.176 Additionally, deterrence is not adequately considered, as Lubanga
would have no reason to be deterred from participating or taking a less substantial role in other crimes, so long as they could
not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
B. The ICC’s Problematic Provisions of Concurrent Sentences
and the Thirty-Year Limit
Additional problems arise as the penalties section of the
Rome Statute, specifically Article 77, seems unable to serve the
purposes of most, if not all, theories of punishment. This inadequacy can be seen first in the thirty-year maximum sentence
that the statute implements for almost all penalties.177 Such a
strict limitation cannot be found in the statutes governing other international tribunals, such as those of Rwanda or Yugoslavia.
The ICC Prosecutor will almost always be unable to request a
sentence greater than thirty years. 178 This limitation further
frustrates having punishments that are proportional to the offense.179 It has ultimately been predetermined that no crime
176. DRESSLER, supra note 136, at 38–46. As discussed in Part II.A, “true
moral culpability” speaks to the heart of the theory of retribution. See id. For
a sentence to reflect the offender’s true moral culpability, it should be proportional. See id. Here, by allowing positive or mitigating factors to decrease the
sentence but not allowing “negative” or aggravating factors to increase it, the
resulting sentence is not proportional to the offender’s actions and therefore
does not reflect the offender’s “true moral culpability.”
177. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 77. Part III.A explains why the life
imprisonment sentence is extremely unlikely because of the additional limiting circumstances that are placed on it by the standards governing aggravating circumstances.
178. See id.; see generally Kevin Jon Heller, A Sentence-Based Theory of
Complementarity, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 85, 113–14 (2012).
179. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 81(2)(a). Despite the several contradictions to this goal, including the thirty-year limitation set forth by the
Rome Statute, the Court states, “pursuant to Article 81(2)(a) of the Statute,
the Chamber must ensure that the sentence is in proportion to the crime.”
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will be proportional to a sentence that is greater than thirty
years but not deserving of life imprisonment.180 Additionally,
even a thirty-year sentence will be a high bar to overcome,
since thirty years is the maximum sentence for almost all cases.181
The problem worsens when the individual and joint sentence
provisions are considered. As seen in Lubanga’s case, he received three sentences of twelve, thirteen, and fourteen years,
but a joint sentence of only fourteen years for all three crimes
he was convicted of.182 First, Lubanga could not be sentenced to
serve these terms consecutively because thirty-nine years is not
an available sentencing option.183 Second, as stated in Article
77, the Court was only required to sentence Lubanga to the
highest of his individual sentences. 184 Hence, the Court sen-

Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Hearing to Deliver the
Decision, 3 (July 10, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1440143.pdf
(emphasis added).
180. According to the Rome Statute, there can be no sentence that is greater
than thirty years, except in extreme situations where a life sentence may be
imposed. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 78(3).
181. If the Court is already afraid to set a high sentence in its first case,
and thirty years will almost always be the maximum sentence, the Court may
be reserving this for the criminals it sees as the worst offenders. However, it
is unclear who the Court will determine this to be or when this may happen.
See Kate Kovarovic, Pleading for Justice: The Availability of Plea Bargaining
as a Method of Alternative Dispute Resolution at the International Criminal
Court, 2011 J. DISP. RESOL. 283, 299–300 (2011). In Kovarovic’s article, this
proposition is additionally supported through the discussion of plea bargains.
Critics also discount the fact that prosecutors must work within the
sentencing confines established by the Tribunal. The sentencing
range of the ICC is “already perceived by some as too low,” as the
Rome Statute does not provide for the death penalty and only allows
life imprisonment to be assigned in exceptional circumstances . . .
The appeal for most defendants in seeking a plea bargain is the hope
of securing a more lenient sentence. When the sentencing maximum
is fairly minimal, prosecutors are thus forced to reduce a defendant’s
sentence even further . . . the problem of leniency stems from the
Rome Statute itself.
Id.
182. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Hearing to Deliver
the Decision, at 11.
183. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 77(1)(a). Thirty-nine years exceeds the
thirty-year limitation. Id.
184. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 78(3).
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tenced Lubanga to the minimum required by the statute, resulting in his fourteen-year sentence.185 Further, without any
type of minimum sentence requirement, the ICC could theoretically choose between zero and thirty years.186 By providing a
minimal explanation to Lubanga’s fourteen-year sentence, it
appears as though the ICC simply chose an arbitrary number
that was in the middle of the available range, influenced only
by a thirty-year limitation, with no mandatory minimum
weighing in.187
Setting such a low bar for its first sentence is not unique for
an international court. The ICTY in Prosecutor v. Erdemovic,
one of the first cases ever before the ICTY, experienced a similar problem.188 The ICTY sentenced Erdemovic to only a fiveyear sentence after he pled guilty to killing between ten and
185. Id.
186. See Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 78(3). As discussed above, although extreme situations may warrant a life sentence, in all other cases
there can be no sentence that is greater than thirty years. Id. Hence, the upper-limit of a sentence will almost always be thirty years. Id. With no minimum sentence provided for in the Rome Statute, the lowest sentence available is theoretically zero years.
187. At the sentencing, the Court addressed all the relevant provisions of
the Rome Statute, as also discussed throughout this Note. See generally Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Hearing to Deliver the Decision. For example, the Court explained that there were no aggravating circumstances as they could not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and
hence, there were no extreme circumstances warranting a life sentence. Id. at
10. The Court also reviewed the mitigating circumstances it would take into
account. Id. at 9. However, other than “taking into account all the factors …
discussed,” an explanation as to why the term of years was fourteen, as opposed to any other available sentence, is not provided in the sentencing transcript. Id. at 11.
188. Marisa Bassett, Defending International Sentencing: Past Criticism to
the Promises of the ICC, HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Winter 2009, at 22, 23. See also
Dubinsky, supra note 11, at 636, where Dubinsky discusses that the ICC
must learn from Erdemovic’s trial.
The purpose of an international court is not to punish crimes such as
petty theft or common law torts. Instead, cases before such a court
will involve serious crimes inflicted on populations of people, such as
crimes against humanity and war crimes. Crimes in front of the ICC
will involve the systemic rape, torture, and murder of many people.
Therefore, the ICC will only try the world’s most heinous criminals.
Because of this, it is unacceptable for people like . . . Drazen Erdemovic to walk out of a jailhouse alive.
Id.
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100 civilian Muslim men.189 The ICTY received major criticism
for imposing such a low first sentence. 190 However, in the
ICTY’s sixty-two convictions, it has ultimately imposed much
higher sentences on many other offenders and has been able to
overcome the low bar it initially set.191 Unfortunately, due to
the joint sentence and thirty-year limitations, it will be very
difficult for the ICC to overcome what many have criticized as a
very low sentence for its first case.192
Finally, the provisions of Article 77 fail to satisfy the theories
of punishment for several reasons. First, based on the theory of
retribution, the punishment should fit and be comparable to
the crime.193 However, based on the Lubanga sentencing, it appears that whether Lubanga committed only the crime deserving of the fourteen-year sentence, or all three crimes, he only
deserved a fourteen-year sentence. This punishment seems to
fit only one of the crimes, rather than all three of them as it
should.194 Second, it is possible that an offender would be deterred from committing a crime based on his or her knowledge
of the ICC and the fact that he or she may face imprisonment.
However, once he or she chooses to commit one crime, there
189. Dubinsky, supra note 11, at 622–25.
190. Bassett, supra note 188, at 23.
191. See generally Weinberg de Roca & Rassi, supra note 161.
192. See DR Congo Warlord Thomas Lubanga Sentenced to 14 Years, supra
note 65.
193. DRESSLER, supra note 136, at 38–46; Leinwand, supra note 130, at 804.
194. The Court rejected the Prosecutor’s argument that there should be a
consistent baseline of 80% of the statutory maximum for sentencing, which
would then take into account aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Hearing to Deliver the Decision, 11 (July 10, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1440143.pdf.
Here, this would be twenty-four years, based on the thirty-year statutory
guideline, and then properly balanced for other circumstances. See id. The
Court rejected the Prosecutor’s proposal and stated that one reason the sentence passed was that the sentence “should always be proportionate to the
crime” and “an automatic starting point—as proposed by the former Prosecutor—that is the same for all offences would tend to undermine that fundamental principle.” Id. at 10. However, this argument can be seen as ironic
considering the joint sentence of fourteen years in the case of Lubanga. Id. at
4. He was individually sentenced to twelve to fourteen years for each of his
three crimes but his joint sentence is only fourteen years. Id. By this standard, it appears that whether one or three crimes was committed, almost the
same sentence would be given. One may argue that this decision of the Court
is contrary to the Article 81(2)(a) requirement that sentences should be proportionate to the crime. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 81(2)(a).
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would be little to deter an offender from committing multiple
crimes when the resulting sentence remains the same. Finally,
with Lubanga returning to the DRC in eight years or less, it
seems unlikely to satisfy the restorative justice theory because
the affected individuals have lost the opportunity to weigh in
on the sentence and have had little time to rebuild peace in the
nation.
IV. A CHANGE FROM OTHER INTERNATIONAL COURTS: WHY THE
NATIONAL DEFERENCE PROVISION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
REMOVED
In order to better serve the theories of punishment, and provide additional means of guidance in sentencing, the Rome
Statute should be amended to provide deference to the laws of
the nation involved. For example, international criminal justice
was sought for the crimes committed by Charles Taylor in Sierra Leone.195 Taylor was found guilty by the Special Court for
Sierra Leone (“SCSL”) for “crimes against humanity and war
crimes,” including murder, rape, mutilation of civilians, and
the use of child soldiers.196 However, in Taylor’s case, the prosecutors requested that he receive eighty years imprisonment,
and the judge ultimately sentenced the 64-year-old Taylor to
fifty years. 197 With a fifty-year sentence, Taylor will likely
spend the rest of his life in prison, whereas Lubanga may return to the DRC in less than eight years.198 There is one factor
that may help to explain this discrepancy. Special international
courts or tribunals like that of the SCSL, and similar to the
ICTY and ICTR, give deference to laws of the nation involved,

195. Thomas Lubanga, Charles Taylor & International Justice, WATCHLIST,
http://www.watchlist.org/thomas-lubanga-charles-taylor-international-justice
(last visited Sept. 5, 2012).
196. Marlise Simons & J. David Goodman, Ex-Liberian Leader Gets 50
TIMES
(May
30,
2012),
Years
for
War
Crimes,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/31/world/africa/charles-taylor-sentenced-to50-years-for-war-crimes.html.
197. Alpha Sesay, Prosecution and Defense to Appeal Charles Taylor JudgTRIAL
OF
CHARLES
TAYLOR,
ment
and
Sentence,
THE
http://www.charlestaylortrial.org/2012/07/20/prosecution-and-defense-toappeal-charles-taylor-judgment-and-sentence/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2012).
198. Simons & Goodman, supra note 196.
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especially when considering “penalties” or sentencing. 199 The
Rome Statute, however, contains no such provision.200
Unlike the SCSL that sentenced Taylor, which is special to
Sierra Leone, or the ICTY and ICTR, which are special to Yugoslavia and Rwanda respectively, the ICC could potentially
take on cases from 122 different nations.201 Initially, considering the increasing commitment required to give deference to a
different nation every time one of its individuals is brought to
the ICC, it makes sense that the ICC removed such a provision
from the Rome Statute. When the principles of “complementarity” and “implementation” are considered, however, the justifications for not giving deference seem to lose support.
First, the principle of complementarity is unique to the ICC,
as it allows the ICC to complement the justice system of the
199. The ICTY, ICTR, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, respectively,
gave deference to the national sentencing guidelines as follows: “The penalty
imposed by the Trial Chamber shall be limited to imprisonment. In determining the terms of imprisonment, the Trial Chambers shall have recourse to the
general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia.” Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in
the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 art. 24(1), U.N. Doc.
S/RES/827 (1993); “The penalty imposed by the Trial Chamber shall be limited to imprisonment. In determining the terms of imprisonment, the trial
chambers shall have recourse to the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of Rwanda.” S.C. Res. 955, Annex art. 23(1), U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). “The Trial Chamber shall impose upon a convicted
person other than a juvenile offender imprisonment for a specified number of
years. In determining the terms of imprisonment the Trial Chamber shall, as
appropriate, have recourse to the practice regarding prison sentences in the
International Tribunal for Rwanda and the national courts of Sierra Leone.”
Agreement for and Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N.-Sierra
Leone, art. 19, Jan. 16, 2002, THE SPECIAL COURT OF SIERRA LEONE,
http://www.sc-sl.org/DOCUMENTS/tabid/176/Default.aspx (last visited Aug.
6, 2013).
200. See Weinberg de Roca & Rassi, supra note 161, at 9. The article states
that “the ICC Statute does not expressly permit recourse to the sentencing
practice of the territory where the crimes were committed; rather, Article
76(1) allows the Chambers to consider such practices if they are relevant to
an ‘appropriate’ sentence.” Id. (quoting Rome Statute, supra note 6, art.
76(1)). The article further states, “it is the general view that the overriding
sentence obligation must be to ‘individualize a penalty to fit the individual
circumstances of the accused and the gravity of the crime.’” Id. (quoting Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, 717 (Feb. 20, 2001); Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, Judgment, 511 (Mar. 15, 2002)).
201. About the Court, supra note 2.
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nation involved.202 As discussed in Part I,203 the ICC is a court
of last resort and the nation must be unable or unwilling to
handle the case before the ICC can gain jurisdiction.204 It is only after the failure of the nation to prosecute its own criminals,
and after acquiring proper jurisdiction, that the ICC will step
in to investigate and prosecute individuals suspected of major
criminal wrongdoing. 205 Second, it is in response to the complementarity principle that “implementation” of the provisions
of the Rome Statute becomes important.206 In order for a state
to maintain its sovereignty, and have the ability to prosecute
its own criminals for international crimes, it must first have
legislation that provides it with jurisdiction over such
crimes.207 For example, if a state has signed the Rome Statute
but does not include “war crimes” in its own penal code or legislation, then the only way war crimes could be prosecuted is by
the ICC. Therefore, the principle of complementarity is not in
force, as the ICC would be the only way to prosecute such
crimes, rather than acting as the court of last resort.208
For this reason, nations adopting the Rome Statute will at
least set forth draft legislation providing penalties in their domestic systems for the same crimes which the ICC may prosecute. 209 This often includes the crimes of genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes, which are offenses prohib-

202. Rome Statute, supra note 6, pmbl. The preamble states that the “International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.” Id.
203. Discussion of jurisdiction can be found in Part I.B.1. of this Note.
204. See Triponel & Pearson, supra note 9, at 67.
205. See id.; see also CARTER & WEINER, supra note 30, at 1143.
206. Triponel & Pearson, supra note 9, at 68. Triponel and Pearson assert
that “this principle [of complementarity] also requires that State Parties take
an active role to implement the Rome Statute into their domestic legislation.”
Id.
207. See Lijun Yang, On the Principle of Complementarity in the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court,
J.
INT’L
L.
121,
123
(2005),
available
at
CHINESE
http://chinesejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/4/1/121.full.
208. See id.
209. Id. at 124–26. See also Lee Stone & Max du Plessis, The Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in African
Countries,
ISSAFRICA,
http://www.issafrica.org/cdromestatute/pages/document.pdf (last visited Jan.
19, 2013).
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ited by the Rome Statute.210 In addition, implementing legislation sets forth sentencing guidelines for how that nation would
punish international crimes.211 For example, Senegal is one nation that has ratified the Rome Statute and put implementing
legislation in force. 212 Several other nations, including the
DRC, have at least drafted implementing legislation.213
In drafting implementing legislation, most countries have
adopted stronger penalties than those in the Rome Statute, and
few African countries have adopted the specific wording of Article 77, or the thirty-year maximum penalty. 214 The DRC is
one example of a nation with draft legislation that sets forth
sentencing guidelines very different from Article 77 and its
thirty-year imprisonment provision.215 For example, Article 25
of the DRC draft legislation states, “whosoever kills a person
protected by international humanitarian law during armed international or non-international conflict, is sentenced to life
imprisonment,” and Article 26(1) states, “[p]unishable by a
criminal sentence of five to twenty years is whosoever takes
hostage a person protected by international humanitarian
law.” 216 Throughout the DRC draft legislation, this format is
followed, and varying degrees of crimes are assigned different
sentences. 217 Additionally, unlike the Rome Statute, many
crimes are assigned a range, including a minimum sentence.218
Importantly, and relevant to Lubanga’s sentencing, is that
the “DRC’s draft legislation has adopted the [Rome] Statute’s
definition of war crimes and has included the recruitment of
children under the age of eighteen years as a punishable offense.”219 This is broader than the Rome Statute, where the age
for penalized enlistment is children under the age of fifteen.220
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

See Stone & Plessis, supra note 209.
Id.; Yang, supra note 207.
Stone & Plessis, supra note 209.
Id.
Triponel & Pearson, supra note 9, at 95–96.
Draft Legislation—Implementation of the Rome Statute, COALITION FOR
THE
INT’L
CRIMINAL
COURT,
available
at
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/DRCDraftLegEng.pdf (last visited Nov. 9,
2012).
216. Id.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. Triponel & Pearson, supra note 9, at 85.
220. Id.
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Since Lubanga’s case provides only an estimate for the thousands of soldiers used, it is unclear if this could have impacted
the ICC’s sentencing.221 Regardless, the DRC’s definition seems
to reflect a desire for broader, harsher enforcement, and this
could have been an influential factor in sentencing.222
If a nation has at least drafted implementing legislation, the
ICC could then easily give deference to how the nation itself
would have prosecuted the crime.223 Although deference to national legislation may not favor uniformity across all states, it
would instead allow for sentences that better reflect the different theories of punishment and are more likely to be respected
as fair and legitimate by each state.224 First, a minimum sentence increases the effectiveness of deterrence, as potential offenders will more likely be aware of the consequences.225 Second, as part of the theory of retribution, the punishment should
fit the crime and provide a moral balance.226 National legislation may provide for sentencing ranges, which include minimums and maximums, resulting in proportional punishments
that better fit the crime.227 Additionally, if a sentence reflects
the legislation that has been recorded by the state, then the
desires of the victims and the community are more likely to be
heard, and the theory of restorative justice is more likely to be
satisfied.228
Although it seems that many African nations have adopted
broader interpretations or recommended higher sentences than
the Rome Statute, this may not always be the case.229 For ex-

221. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Hearing to Deliver
the
Decision,
5
(July
10,
2012),
http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1440143.pdf.
222. See Triponel & Pearson, supra note 9, at 85. The DRC’s desire can be
assumed by its clear change in guidelines in draft legislation.
223. See generally id. at 84–85.
224. This specifically speaks to the theories of retribution and restorative
justice. Additionally, increased awareness of the sentence one may face could
also serve as a better deterrent.
225. See generally New Zealand Sentencing Paper, supra note 128.
226. See Dubinsky, supra note 11, at 618.
227. See Draft Legislation—Implementation of the Rome Statute, supra note
216; see generally Stone & du Plessis, supra note 209.
228. See Leinwand, supra note 130, at 809.
229. See generally Implementation of the Rome Statute, COALITION FOR THE
INT’L
CRIMINAL
COURT,
available
at
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=romeimplementation (last visited Nov. 9, 2012).
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ample, there may be state parties that adopt draft legislation
that actually lends support to or even lowers the maximum
penalties below the thirty years provided by the Rome Statute. 230 Regardless, the theories of punishment, especially restorative justice to the victims and the community, would be
best satisfied by giving deference to a nation’s draft implementing legislation. 231 Therefore, “complementarity,” “implementation,” draft legislation, and the different theories of punishment all lend support to giving deference to how a nation would
sentence an individual who has committed an international
crime in its territory.
V. FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS
As discussed, the criticisms of the ICTY and ICTR left the
drafters of the Rome Statute in pursuit of sentencing provisions that would result in greater consistency in sentencing.232
The drafters of the Rome Statute chose to continue the balancing of mitigating, aggravating, and individual circumstances
with the gravity of the crime.233 However, the Rome Statute
included the additional use of a thirty-year imprisonment limitation that would be applicable in almost all cases.234 Finally,
the Rome Statute differed from the guidelines governing the
ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL when it did not include the provision
requiring deference to national law.235
Unfortunately, in a possible attempt to reach more consistent
results, the drafters of the Rome Statute granted the ICC judges too much discretion and failed to account for the theories of
punishment. Lubanga’s case demonstrates that the problems
that existed in the ICTY and ICTR have carried over to the ICC
and will likely result in further inconsistencies in the future.
However, rather than focus solely on “consistency,” the drafters
of the Rome Statute should have given more consideration to
the discretion granted to judges, the theories of punishment,
and the purposes that the punishment of international criminals should serve.

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id.
See infra text accompanying note 238.
See supra text accompanying note 161.
Rome Statute, supra note 6, arts. 77–78.
Id. art. 77.
See sources cited supra note 199.
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First, the thirty-year imprisonment provision should be removed. Even if the thirty-year limitation leads to greater consistency in sentencing, it will do little to deter criminals by imposing sentences that are too lenient, thereby failing the theories of punishment and resulting in minimal justice for victims.236 Hence, by focusing only on consistency, the ICC is failing to recognize its most important purpose, to punish “the
perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community.”237 However, by deferring to national legislation, any state party concerns regarding the removal of the
thirty-year imprisonment provision may be counterbalanced.238
Additionally, deferring to national legislation will often provide
a sentencing range, including a minimum, 239 making it more
difficult for the ICC to arbitrarily sentence perpetrators.
Second, finding a solution for the balance of mitigating and
aggravating circumstances is a more challenging endeavor.
However, allowing the ICC broad discretion to choose the
standards of proof used to evaluate these circumstances does
not aid the situation. Alternatively, the same standard of proof
should be used for both mitigating and aggravating circumstances, whether that standard is balancing of the probabilities, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or an intermediate
standard of proof such as clear and convincing evidence.240 This
will serve to remove some judicial discretion and lead to sen-

236. If all proposed recommendations were adopted, however, and a state
implementing legislation involved the use of thirty-year maximum imprisonment sentences, then that would be acceptable. This is because the ICC
would be giving deference to the nations and restoring justice in a way that
the victims and society approves of.
237. See About the Court, supra note 2 (emphasis added).
238. Assuming that both this recommendation and the later recommendation for deference to national implementation legislation were adopted, a procedural safeguard would be provided for any states that disagree with the
removal of the thirty-year limitation. For example, a state could reinstate the
thirty-year limitation, or any limitation for that matter, in their implementing legislation, and that would be given deference. Therefore, any concerns
regarding the removal of the thirty-year limitation would be counterbalanced
by deference to national legislation.
239. See Stone & Plessis, supra note 209. This is based on the earlier explanation that the ICC arbitrarily chose a sentence between zero and thirty
years. See supra text accompanying note 186. Having some type of minimum
guideline would prevent the ICC from sentencing below a certain threshold.
240. See supra text accompanying note 52.
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tences that fairly and equitably balance both positive and negative considerations relating to the defendant.
Finally, the ICC should reinstate the provision of the ICTY,
ICTR, and SCSL that allow for deference to the law of the nation, and specifically allow for at least some deference to drafts
of implementing legislation. Although this may not result in
consistency on the international level, it would result in consistency on the national level by taking away some of the broad
discretion granted to the ICC; and most importantly, it would
cater to the theories of punishment. First, it connects the “departure from international sentencing guidelines to a State’s
domestic law” or implementation law. 241 This in turn “both justifies its reasoning to the international community, and assures
the domestic constituency that local values will be considered
and protected.”242 Second, it forces the court to “express its reasoning, avoiding reliance on discretion alone.”243 This would, in
effect, limit the ICC’s broad discretion and force it to better
serve the injured nation.244
By implementing all of these changes, the ICC would ultimately use the relevant nation’s draft legislation as a guideline
for the sentence, mitigating and aggravating circumstances
would be equally weighed into the sentencing equation, and the
thirty-year provision would no longer apply. These changes
would better serve all of the theories of punishment. First, with
national legislation providing a different sentence range based
on the offense, and the removal of the thirty-year limitation,
the sentences would be “proportional” to the offence committed
241. Leinwand, supra note 130, at 850.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. See Keller, supra note 7, at 57. In the section entitled “The Use of Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances,” Keller discussed that “the [ICTY
and ICTR] Trial Chambers’ discretion is perhaps too broad and should be
limited by general sentencing guidelines.” Id.
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and better satisfy the theory of retribution. Second, the removal of the thirty-year limitation and the equal weighing of mitigating and aggravating circumstances would provide for
harsher sentences, strengthening the general deterrent effect.
Finally, by deferring to draft legislation, the nation itself will
weigh in on the sentence, helping to restore justice to that nation.
In the end, Lubanga is the first and only case the ICC has
considered. With proper changes to its sentencing guidelines,
the ICC can be a strong enforcer of international criminal law
that deters future offenders, punishes perpetrators based on
their true moral culpability, and brings restorative justice to
the nations involved.
Ashley Joy Stein*

